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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS/PRIVACY—STAY CALM,
DON’T GET HYSTERICAL: A USER’S GUIDE TO ARGUING THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-VIBRATOR STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
On March 5, 2010 the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld an
Alabama statute that prohibits the sale and distribution of sexual
devices.1 The statute makes it illegal “to knowingly distribute, pos
sess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute . . . any
obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful pri
marily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of
pecuniary value.”2 For reasons to be explained in this Note, the
Alabama Supreme Court decided to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Williams v. Attorney General, a 2004 case that upheld
the very same Alabama statute.3 In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the statute was constitutional and refused to extend the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas 4 to
the commercial activity involved with the sale and distribution of
1. 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319, 341 (Ala.
2010) (en banc). A distributor of the devices, including vibrators and dildos, (in a
counter-claim) argued that the statute violated the United States Constitution’s right to
due process and that the Alabama Supreme Court should follow the reasoning in Relia
ble Consultants, Inc. v. Earle. Id. (citing Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d
738 (5th Cir. 2008)). Dr. Marty Klein, author of America’s War on Sex: The Attack on
Law, Lust & Liberty, stated: “‘The Supreme Court has declared our orgasms a battle
field, and sex toys another casualty.’” David Holthouse, Alabama v. Dildos, Attorney
General Troy King Stands Hard Against Stimulators, DAME MAG., http://www.dame
magazine.com/features/f261/AlabamavsDildos.php?Page=2 (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
In response to the ruling, Representative John Rogers (D-Birmingham) sponsored a
bill to remove the ban on the devices, stating: “‘A shower head can be a sex toy. . . . It’s
just a matter of bringing the state into the 21st Century.’” Id. Attorney General Troy
King of Alabama claims the statute’s goal is to prevent the “‘evil of commerce of sexual
stimulation and auto-eroticism, for its own sake.’” Id. Citizens of Alabama were called
upon to send the Attorney General “‘the most humiliating sex toy they [could] find.’”
Id.
2. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005). Section (a)(2) makes it
unlawful for “a wholesaler, to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or
offer to agree to distribute, for the purpose of resale or commercial distribution at re
tail” any sexual device. Id. § 13A-12-200.2(a)(2). Section (a)(3) made it illegal to “pro
duce” such devices. Id. § 13A-12-200.2(a)(3).
3. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).
4. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute
prohibiting homosexual conduct was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Four
teenth Amendment).
211
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the sexual devices.5 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Alabama
recognized that a Fifth Circuit case, Reliable Consultants, Inc. v.
Earle,6 extended the ruling in Lawrence to a Texas statute also
prohibiting the sale of sexual devices.7 As the Supreme Court of
Alabama stated, succinctly identifying the topic of this Note: “It is
clear from the discussions in Williams VI [Williams v. Attorney
General, 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004)] and Reliable Consul
tants that the debate about the scope of Lawrence v. Texas remains
open.”8
The current split in the circuit courts, most recently recognized
in 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover centers on just
how far Lawrence extends beyond the facts of that case, and
whether Lawrence is applicable to activity outside the home.9 The
Fifth Circuit stated that “[o]nce Lawrence is properly understood to
explain the contours of the substantive due process right to sexual
intimacy, the case plainly applies.”10 The question then becomes:
does Lawrence really plainly apply? While the Fifth Circuit seems
to think the case applies to the sale and distribution of sexual de
vices, the Eleventh Circuit clearly does not and has stated that it
“[declines] to extrapolate from Lawrence and its dicta a right to
sexual privacy triggering strict scrutiny.”11 Therefore, there is cur
rently one circuit under the impression that Lawrence clearly ap
plies to these statutes prohibiting the sale of sexual devices, and
another circuit under the impression that they would have to “ex
trapolate” from the language of Lawrence in order to rule these
statutes unconstitutional.
This Note explores the question of whether Lawrence extends
to the commercial activity prohibited by statutes such as the one in
Alabama. This Note will argue that the analysis in both the Fifth
and the Eleventh Circuits regarding the sale and distribution of sex
ual devices are improper. While this Note argues, in agreement
with the Fifth Circuit, that selling and distributing sexual devices
should be constitutionally protected across the board, this Note ar
gues that Lawrence is not the applicable case in asserting that these
5.
6.
7.
2010).
8.
9.
10.
11.

Williams, 378 F.3d at 1238.
Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744-45.
1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319, 337-41 (Ala.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744.
Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004).
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statutes are unconstitutional. Lawrence has left the question of
whether there is a new fundamental right to privacy unclear.12 The
confusion over Lawrence is evidenced by the current circuit split.
However, the proper analysis involves Carey v. Population Services
International 13 and the line of Supreme Court cases ruling on the
sale and distribution of contraceptives since sexual devices are be
ing used more frequently for health and birth control reasons. This
Note will argue that because creating a new fundamental right is so
difficult, the best way to ensure statutes, like the ones in Alabama
and Texas, are deemed unconstitutional is to place the sale and dis
tribution of sexual devices under the already-existing right pro
tected in the Carey line of cases. If the sale and distribution of
sexual devices is successfully included within an established funda
mental right, the statutes will move beyond a rational basis review
and achieve a strict scrutiny review, which will allow courts the op
portunity to deem the statutes as too burdensome.
Part I of this Note chronicles the history of sexual devices in
America. Part II provides some historical background on the case
law and development of the idea of examining “sexual privacy”
through the so-called “sexual freedom cases.”14 Part III gives a
brief history of the state case law that has developed around stat
utes that control the sale of these devices. Part IV discusses the
current circuit split among the Fifth and Eleventh circuits and the
Lawrence v. Texas decision. Part V argues that Lawrence is not the
proper case for analyzing the constitutionality of sexual device stat
utes, due to the commercial activity dealt with in this topic, but that
the real support lies in Griswold and its progeny.
I. THE HISTORY

OF

SEXUAL DEVICES

IN THE

UNITED STATES

A. The Vibrator: Pre-1920
The end of the nineteenth century brought the development of
the first vibrator as an electromechanical medical instrument.15
Prior to the development of the vibrator, physicians and midwives
would manually massage their female patients to orgasm as a cure
12. 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc., 45 So. 3d at 340.
13. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
14. Angela Holt, Comment, From My Cold Dead Hands: Williams v. Pryor and
the Constitutionality of Alabama’s Anti-Vibrator Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 927, 938 (2002).
15. RACHEL P. MAINES, THE TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM 3 (Merritt Roe Smith
eds., 1999). The author would like to note that there is very little written about the
history and development of sexual devices in the United States. That is why the pre
dominant source for this part of the background is Maine’s book.
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for “hysteria.”16 The invention came as a relief to physicians, who
were looking for a way to therapeutically cure these women, but in
such a way “that neither fatigued the therapist nor demanded skills
that were difficult and time-consuming to acquire.”17 The efficiency
of the mechanical device facilitated a much more productive office,
which was necessary owing to frequent repeated visits by hysterical
patients.18 By 1900, there was an increasing variety of vibrators,
ranging “from low[er] priced . . . models to the Cadillac of vibrators,
the Chattanooga.”19
Post-1900, there were numerous big incentives for people to
purchase these vibrators for “self-treatment,” rather than continu
ally having to go to a doctor’s office every time symptoms oc
curred.20 It was much cheaper to purchase a home device than to
go back for repeated doctor visits.21 Additionally, not only was it
more cost efficient, but it allowed for use at home alone and as
often as was needed or desired.22
With the increasing popularity and availability of electricity in
the home, women became heavy consumers of electrical devices.23
The vibrator was the fifth home appliance manufactured to run
from electricity, preceded only by the sewing machine, the fan, the
teakettle, and the toaster.24
16. Id. “Massage to orgasm of female patients was a staple of medical practice
among some (but certainly not all) Western physicians from the time of Hippocrates
until the 1920s, and mechanizing this task significantly increased the number of patients
a doctor could treat in a working day.” Id. “Hysteria” was literally translated to
“womb disease” and was considered to be extremely prevalent in women. Id. at 1-3.
17. Id. at 11. Maines points out that “[t]here is really no evidence that male phy
sicians enjoyed providing pelvic massage treatments,” and that they would try to dele
gate the duty to anyone, or anything, they could. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 15. The first electromechanical vibrator was designed by Joseph Morti
mer Granville in the 1880s. Id. It was battery operated and similar to the modern
version of the vibrator. Id. “At the Paris Exposition in 1900, there were exhibited
more than a dozen [v]ibrators.” SAMUEL MONELL, A SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION IN X
RAY METHODS AND MEDICAL USES OF LIGHT, HOT AIR, VIBRATION AND HIGH FRE
QUENCY CURRENTS 595 (1902).
20. MAINES, supra note 15, at 100.
21. Id. The cost of purchasing an at-home vibrator did not cost more than four or
five visits to the doctor. Id.
22. Id. There were also water-powered vibrators, but the battery powered de
vices were more desirable as they could be used almost anywhere. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. It is interesting to note that the electrical vibrator actually came before
“the electric vacuum cleaner by . . . nine years, the electric iron by ten, and the electric
frying pan by more than a decade, possibly reflecting consumer priorities.” Id.; see also
MALCOM MACLAREN, THE RISE OF THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY DURING THE NINE
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Rachel Maines notes that the first advertising for a vibrator
appeared in McClure’s Magazine in 1899 and was for the “Vibra
tile.”25 There was a brief period in the first two decades of the
twentieth century when water-powered vibrators were quite popu
lar, including the “Hydro-Massage,” which was advertised in the
December 1906 issue of Modern Women.26 However, the great ma
jority of advertisements for vibrators in the first three decades of
the twentieth century came in the form of those that are still pro
duced today for “home massage.”27 Most often, when magazines
would have advertisements for vibrators, they were hardly men
tioned in any other way throughout the magazine.28 These devices
were not just limited to smaller, no-name manufacturers; big names
like General Electric took out full-page ads for “The Home Electri
cal” between the years 1915 and 1917.29 Sears, Roebuck and Com
pany advertised six models of vibrators in their Electrical Goods
catalog in 1918.30 Between 1900 and 1920, most of the devices were
available by mail order.31 Starting in the 1920s some brands, which
CENTURY 91, 96 (1943); SIGVARD STRANDH, A HISTORY OF THE MACHINE
225-26 (Turlough Johnston & Kerstin Stälbrand eds., Ann Henning trans., 1979).
25. MAINES, supra note 15, at 100. The advertisement claimed that the “Vibratile” was a cure for “neuralgia,” “headache,” and “wrinkles.” Id. (quoting MCCLURE’S
MAG., Mar. 1899, at 158). Around this time, the sale of “massagers” had begun to
increase immensely and the makers of these devices claimed they could cure any variety
of diseases. Id. It should be noted that none of these ads were explicitly sexual, but
they all had an underlying tone of sexuality. For example, one ad for a vibrator stated,
“‘The most perfect woman is she whose blood pulses and oscillates in unison with the
natural law of being.’” Id. at 101 (quoting To Women I Address My Message of Health
and Beauty, NAT’L HOME J., Apr. 1908, at 17 (advertisement from Bebout Vibrator
Company)). An ad in Woman’s Home Companion in 1906 used language that would
lead a reader today to wonder: “The number and strength of the movements that can be
applied by hand are extremely limited; the perfectly adjusted American Vibrator runs
indefinitely and is susceptible of a variety and rapidity of movements utterly impossible
of human attainment.” MAINES, supra note 15, at 103 (emphasis omitted).
26. MAINES, supra note 15, at 101-02 (referring to an advertisement for the Werner Motor Company’s water-powered “Hydro-massage” appearing in MODERN WO
MEN, Dec. 1906, at 190).
27. Id. at 102.
28. Id. at 103. There are apparently two exceptions to this rule: (1) in June 1908,
a “Review of Reviews” cautioned readers against using the devices in excess, and (2) in
1916, a “Good Housekeeping” review that stated the vibrators were “‘soothing to the
skin.’” Id.
29. Id. at 104; see also GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, A GENERAL ELECTRIC
SCRAPBOOK HISTORY, WITH COMMENTARY 22 (n.d.) (scrapbook distributed by General
Electric that includes advertisements of the “The Home Electrical”).
30. MAINES, supra note 15, at 104 (emphasis omitted). Along with the vibrators,
the catalog included advertisements for everyday appliances like “coffee urns, toasters,
irons, heaters, [and] hair dryers.” Id.
31. Id.
TEENTH

R

R
R
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could be purchased at retail stores, were specifically advertised to
men as great gift ideas for women.32 The most widely advertised of
the brands were the White Cross Electric Vibrators.33 The ads for
these vibrators appeared “in Needlecraft, Home Needlework Maga
zine, American Magazine, Modern Priscilla, the National Home
Journal, and Hearst’s.”34
B. The Vibrator-Post 1920-Present
After about 1928, advertisements for vibrators essentially dis
appeared until the re-emergence of “the modern vibrator . . . in the
1960s as a frankly sexual toy.”35 Historian Roger Blake has
deemed the “vibrator[ ] the ‘oldest sex gadget of the twentieth cen
tury.’”36 Blake adds to his observation by noting that there was a
prominent display of a vibrator in a 1920s movie entitled “Widow’s
Delight.”37 The movie showed a woman using a vibrator in an
overtly sexual way, essentially making visible what many had cho
sen to ignore with regards to vibrators, and removing the veil of the
vibrator as simply a home or medical device.38 Maines postulates
32. Id.
33. Id. at 104-05; see also DAVID J. PIVAR, PURITY CRUSADE: SEXUAL MORALITY
AND SOCIAL CONTROL, 1868-1900 110-17 (1973). “The brand, White Cross, was drawn
from the name of an Episcopalian sexual purity organization that flourished in Britain
in the late 1880s.” MAINES, supra note 15, at 107. This particular “society was introduced to America by . . . the Women’s Christian Temperance Union; its name on the . . .
vibrator must have been intended to suggest virtue and chastity.” Id.
34. MAINES, supra note 15, at 107. The ads stated:
“You can relieve pain, stiffness and weakness, and you can make the body
plump and build it up with thrilling, refreshing vibration and electricity. Just a
few minutes’ use of the wonderful vibrator and the red blood tingles through
your veins and arteries and you feel vigorous, strong and well. With our Elec
tric Vibrator and special attachments you can convert any chair into a perfect
vibrating chair without extra cost, getting the genuine Swedish Movement and
wonderfully refreshing effects, the same treatment for which you would have
to pay at least $2.00 each in a physician’s office.”
Id. (quoting from a magazine advertisement appearing in: MODERN PRISCILLA, Dec.
1910, at 27). A similar ad read:
“Vibration is life. It will chase away the years like magic. Every nerve, every
fibre of your whole body will tingle with force of your own awakened powers.
All the keen relish, the pleasures of youth, will throb within you. Rich, red
blood will be sent coursing through your veins and you will realize thoroughly
the joy of living. Your self-respect, even, will be increased a hundredfold.”
Id. at 108 (quoting from a magazine advertisement appearing in: AM. MAG., Jan. 1913).
35. Id. There were some ads in the 1950s for massagers, but not for the vibrator.
Id.
36. Id. (quoting ROGER BLAKE, SEX GADGETS 33-34, 46 (1968)).
37. Id.
38. Id.

R

R
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that this type of exposure might have contributed to the vibrator
being far less accepted in the home market since it no longer had
the “social camouflage” provided by respectable home and medical
uses.39
While vibrators were not as heavily advertised between 1930
and 1970, it appears they were still available.40 Starting in the latter
half of the twentieth century and continuing until today, “the vibra
tor has become an overtly sexual device.”41 Additionally, therapists
often use it for treating women that are having difficulty reaching
orgasm through other sexual activity.42
The use of vibrators for medical and health purposes is still
fairly prevalent today. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has recognized the use of “‘powered vaginal muscle stimulators’
and ‘genital vibrators’ for the treatment of sexual dysfunction or as
an adjunct to Kegel’s exercise (tightening of the muscles of the pel
vic floor to increase muscle tone).”43 The FDA requires that a
premarket approval application (PMA) be filed “for any powered
vaginal muscle stimulator” that is in commercial distribution.44
These types of regulations also demonstrate that the federal gov
ernment recognizes, at least medically, the utility of such devices.45
The FDA categorizes the powered-vaginal-muscle stimulator, as a
Class III device.46
The FDA describes devices in Class III as “those that support
or sustain human life, are of substantial importance in preventing
impairment of human health, or which present a potential, unrea
sonable risk of illness or injury.”47 Section 884 of the federal regu
lations classifies devices categorized as “obstetrical and
39. Id.
40. Id. at 109. Maines draws this conclusion because several authors in that time
referenced vibrators and massagers with little explanation, presumably meaning they
were still around and that knowledge about them remained well known. Id.
41. Id. at 121.
42. Id. at 122.
43. State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 75 (La. 2000); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.5940
.5960 (2010).
44. § 884.5940; see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DEVICE CLASSIFICATION,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/Classify
YourDevice/default.htm (last updated Apr. 27, 2009).
45. Brenan, 772 So. 2d at 75.
46. § 884.5940.
47. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., PREMARKET APPROVAL (PMA), http://www.
fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/Pre
marketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA/ucm2007514.htm (last updated Sept. 3,
2010). “PMA is the most stringent type of device marketing application required by
FDA.” Id.
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gynecological,”48 some of which are included under the Class III
egorization. Other Class III devices include “contraceptive in
trauterine device (IUD) and introducer” and “contraceptive tubal
occlusion device (TOD) and introducer.”49
Presently, the vibrator is experiencing a renaissance of sorts
and “the days of trying to buy a vibrator at a XXX porn shop out by
the airport are long gone.”50 Not only are those days gone, but the
days of vibrators taking center stage are literally here. Playwright
Sarah Ruhl wrote a play that has done just this.51 The play, entitled
“In the Next Room or the vibrator play,” is set in the 1880s and
revolves around “a doctor in upstate New York who uses a vibrator
to treat ‘hysteria’ in women, [and] explores the conflicted territory
of sex and intimacy in the moral climate of the Victorian Age.”52
The play is partially inspired by Rachel Maine’s The Technology of
Orgasm: Hysteria, the Vibrator and Women’s Sexual Satisfaction.53
This play, written with an eye toward Broadway, might appear to
indicate a movement toward more openness about the subject of
sexual devices. There are several instances in the play where the
audience sees “depictions of two women and a man using
vibrators.”54 During one of the performances, a man in the audi
ence left the theater and explained to his wife that this was a play
for women.55 In another instance, a husband stood up during a vi
brator scene and moved ten seats away from his wife.56 One person
associated with the play, explained how he tends to downplay the
word “vibrator,” because he finds the word effectively scares peo
ple away before they even know what the play is really about.57
The play, though considered by some as a play for women,
reached a new level in the world of theater. The play was nomi
48. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 884.1-.5970; see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DEVICE
CLASSIFICATION PANELS, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationand
Guidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051530.htm (last updated May 13, 2009).
49. § 884.5360; see also § 884.5380.
50. Neelanjana Banerjee, Plug it In: The Many Joys of Sex Toys Takes it to the
Next Level, NAT’L SEXUALITY RESOURCE CTR. (Jan. 10, 2004), http://nsrc.sfsu.edu/
article/plug_it_many_joys_sex_toys_takes_it_next_level.
51. Ellen Gamerman, Blushes Over Broadway, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704402404574529691155408608.html?
mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsThird.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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nated for several Tony Awards.58 “In the Next Room or the vibra
tor play” was recognized in three categories: Best Play, Best
Performance by a Featured Actress in a Play, and Best Costume
Design of a Play.59 It appears as though America, however, was not
ready for the play to win a 2010 Tony.60
So, while the days of purchasing sexual devices by the airport
might be gone, the word “vibrator” and the subject matter is still
seen as somewhat taboo. Even in a time when both men and wo
men have starred in and purchased tickets to a play depicting the
use of vibrators, it is still thought of as a subject affecting mostly
women.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF “SEXUAL PRIVACY” IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE “SEXUAL FREEDOM CASES”
A.

Griswold v. Connecticut

The first case in the line of the so-called “sexual freedom
cases” is Griswold v. Connecticut.61 The appellant, Griswold, was
the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Con
necticut.62 The League would often educate married couples about
contraceptives, including “information, instruction, and medical ad
vice.”63 Griswold and several colleagues “were found guilty as ac
cessories” for violating two Connecticut statutes.64 The Supreme
Court ruled that the appellants had standing to sue and raise the
constitutional rights of the married people they worked with.65
Furthermore, the Court explained that the laws directly affected
“an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role
in one aspect of that relation.”66 By finding support in its First
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court stated that the rights enu
58. Who’s Nominated?, TONY AWARDS (June 13, 2010), http://www.tonyawards.
com/en_US/nominees/index.html.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. Id. at 480.
63. Id.
64. Id. The first statute stated, “‘Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article
or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty
dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined
and imprisoned.’” Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (repealed 1969)). The sec
ond statute read, “‘Any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands
another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the prin
cipal offender.’” Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196 (repealed 1969)).
65. Id. at 481.
66. Id. at 482.
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merated “in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.”67 Accordingly, the Court concluded that there are vari
ous “zones of privacy” that are found throughout the Bill of
Rights.68 The Court held that the marital relationship is one that
lies within this zone of privacy.69 In finding the Connecticut stat
utes unconstitutional, the Court recognized that marital privacy was
particularly rooted in the past, and therefore it would be particu
larly problematic to intrude on such a relationship.70
B. Eisenstadt v. Baird
Seven years later, the Supreme Court once again addressed the
constitutionality of a statute regulating the distribution of birth con
trol, but this time the statute in question was aimed at single per
sons.71 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the plaintiff was convicted of
violating a Massachusetts statute forbidding the distribution of con
traceptives to a person who did not fall within the married person
exception of the statute.72 The Court found the statute’s “goals of
deterring premarital sex and regulating the distribution of poten
tially harmful articles” not legitimate and “violate[d] the rights of
single persons under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”73 Unlike the statutes at issue in Griswold, these stat
utes prohibited the distribution, but not the use, of contraceptives
67. Id. at 484.
68. Id. The Court pointed to the right to association in the First Amendment; the
right to be free from soldiers invading the home when at peace and the right to be free
from searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment; the right to not self-incriminate
in the Fifth Amendment; and the Ninth Amendment’s guarantee that simply because
there are rights listed, does not mean they are exhaustive, as showing that the Constitu
tion itself protects these “zones of privacy.” Id.
69. Id. at 485.
70. See id. at 486.
71. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-42 (1972). After a speech at Boston
University, the defendant, who became the appellee, gave a woman Emko vaginal
foam. Id. at 440.
72. Id. at 440. The relevant part of the statute reads, in relevant part, “‘whoever
. . . gives away . . . any drug, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention
of conception,’ except as authorized in s[ection] 21A.” Id. at 440-41 (first and second
alterations in original) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 21A (1966)). The excep
tion discussed in section 21A reads, in relevant part, “‘A registered physician may ad
minister to or prescribe for any married person drugs or articles intended for the
prevention of pregnancy or conception. A registered pharmacist actually engaged in
the business of pharmacy may furnish such drugs or articles to any married person
presenting a prescription from a registered physician.’” Id. at 441 (quoting MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 272, § 21A).
73. Id. at 443.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE105.txt

unknown

Seq: 11

27-SEP-11

10:20

2011] THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-VIBRATOR STATUTES

221

by single persons.74 The Court went on to say, “If the right of pri
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.”75
C. Roe v. Wade
The next year, the landmark case of Roe v. Wade was de
cided.76 At issue were Texas statutes that criminalized abortion.77
The statutes made it illegal to “‘procure an abortion,’” unless it was
“‘procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of sav
ing the life of the mother.’”78 After surveying the history of abor
tion,79 the Court noted that though the Constitution does not
specifically say anything about a right to privacy, there is much
in the case law to support a right of personal privacy within
“certain areas or zones of privacy.”80 This right to privacy,
wherever it is derived from,81 is large enough to protect a wom
an’s choice to end her pregnancy.82 This right, however, is not
74. Id. at 446.
75. Id. at 453 (emphasis omitted).
76. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the unmarried and preg
nant plaintiff sought an abortion by a “licensed physician, under safe, clinical condi
tions,” but was prohibited from doing so by the Texas statutes in question. Id. at 120
(internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 116.
78. Id. at 117-18. An abortion was defined as “mean[ing] that the life of the fetus
or embryo shall be destroyed in the woman’s womb or that a premature birth thereof
be caused.” Id. at 117 n.1. Further:
“If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant woman or know
ingly procure to be administered with her consent any drug or medicine, or
shall use towards her any violence or means whatever externally or internally
applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be confined in the peniten
tiary not less than two nor more than five years.”
Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191).
79. Id. at 129-52.
80. Id. at 152.
81. The Court did not purport to say precisely or definitively where this right of
privacy came from, only that it exists “whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend
ment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or,
as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the
people.” Id. at 153.
82. Id. The Court noted that “additional offspring” can have a great impact on
the life of a woman, including the psychological, mental, and physical-health aspects of
requiring a woman to carry a pregnancy to term. Id. This is particularly true when that
woman is not in a condition to care for the child. Id.
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absolute.83 The right of personal privacy must be balanced with a
state’s valid interests in regulating the sphere of abortion,84 but
those state interests must be compelling and narrowly tailored to
such an interest.85
D. Carey v. Population Services International
In 1977, the Supreme Court had the opportunity yet again to
hear a case concerning the sale and distribution of contraceptives.86
In Carey v. Population Services International, the appellee was a
company that had its main office in North Carolina, but regularly
sold and advertised contraceptives, by mail, to the residents of New
York.87 The company filled contraceptive orders with no concern
as to the recipient’s age.88 After receiving several letters from New
York officials alleging they were in violation of New York law, the
company brought suit challenging the statute.89 Again, the Court
stated that there were “‘certain areas or zones of privacy’” that
were protected from government interference.90 The Court ex
plained, “the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at
the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected
choices.”91 The Court believed that the decision to actually con
ceive, or to prevent such from occurring, is one that is particularly
personal.92 However, this right is not absolute, and there could in
83. Id. at 154 (“[A] State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.”).
84. Id. In the end, the determined “compelling point” was at the end of the wo
men’s first trimester, and prior to that, it should be left up to the woman and her doctor
to decide, without state interference, whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at
163. Prior to determining this compelling point, the Court went into significant detail
and discussion about when life actually begins, and whether the Fourteenth Amend
ment included an unborn fetus in the definition of a “person.” Id. at 159-63.
85. Id. at 155.
86. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
87. Id. at 682.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 682-84. The New York statute reviewed by the court stated, in relevant
part, that it was a crime “(1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive of any
kind to a minor under the age of 16 years; (2) for anyone other than a licensed pharma
cist, to distribute contraceptives to persons 16 or over; and (3) for anyone, including
licensed pharmacists, to advertise or display contraceptives.” Id. at 681.
90. Id. at 684 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152). While the Court noted “that the
outer limits of” a person being able to make certain decisions had not been decided,
there were certain inclusions of personal decisions that already existed “‘relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educa
tion.’” Id. at 684-85 (citations omitted) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53).
91. Id. at 685.
92. Id.
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theory be constitutionally permitted regulation of the production
and sale of contraceptives.93
New York attempted to argue that previous case law regarding
the use of contraceptives should not apply because the statutes at
issue in this case regulated the sale and distribution of contracep
tives; the other cases should not affect the State’s power to limit
such sales.94 “The fatal fallacy” with this defense was that it did not
grasp “the underlying premise of” the previous decisions.95 That
underlying premise was that the Constitution protects an individ
ual’s right to decide whether to conceive or not to conceive.96 The
Court recognized that there was no “independent fundamental
‘right of access to contraceptives,’ but” that this access was inextri
cably intertwined with the right to decide whether or not to bear or
beget a child, which is where the fundamental right lies.97 The re
striction on the attainment of contraceptives too severely burdened
this right.98 This was the true reasoning behind the three previous
cases decided by the Court.99 The limitation that the New York
statute placed on contraceptives was a heavy burden on those who
wanted to use them.100 The narrow provision allowing physicians to
93. Id. at 685-86. The Court noted that “even a burdensome regulation may be
validated by a sufficiently compelling state interest . . . [and as in abortion,] the right is
not absolute, and . . . certain state interests” might be compelling enough to govern the
abortion decision. Id. at 686.
94. Id. at 686-87.
95. Id. at 687.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 688.
98. Id. at 687.
99. Id. at 689.
100. Id. The Court noted that the burden in this case was not as great as if there
had been a complete ban of distribution, but that reducing the number of “retail outlets
renders contraceptive devices considerably less accessible to the public, reduces the op
portunity for privacy of selection and purchase, and lessens the possibility of price com
petition.” Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, the Court believed that Doe v. Bolton
was particularly relevant in this discussion, as the Court there ruled unconstitutional “a
statute requiring that abortions be performed only in accredited hospitals.” Id. (citing
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 193-95 (1973)).
In defense of the provision that prohibited the sale of contraceptives to those
under sixteen years old, the appellants argued that it was an attempt to further the
State’s policy of preventing “promiscuous sexual intercourse among the young.” Id. at
692. The Court initially struggled with this provision, as they were somewhat bothered
by the fact that this particular conduct, when done by adults, was constitutionally pro
tected and previous cases had noted that “‘[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.’” Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)). The Court found unpersuasive the
appellants’ argument that providing unlimited access to contraceptives to minors would
increase their sexual activity. Id. at 694-95. There was reason to question whether not
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prescribe contraceptives to minors did not make the statute consti
tutional.101 Finally, the provision prohibiting advertising contracep
tives was also deemed unconstitutional.102 The Court noted that, in
general, a burden placed on a fundamental right, such as to bear or
beget a child, could only be supported by “compelling state inter
ests” at are “narrowly drawn to express only those interests.”103
Some believe that the above decisions show an underlying
“right to engage in sexual activities for purposes other than repro
duction,” or the “right to sex” view.104 Proponents of this view ar
gue that these cases create a right to sexual autonomy.105
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW IN THE STATE COURTS
PRE-LAWRENCE: STATE STATUTES

There are currently three states that have statutes prohibiting
the sale and distribution of sexual devices.106 These three states are

allowing unlimited access would actually encourage minors to be less sexually active.
Id. at 695. While the Court claimed that any studies showing the high rate of sexual
activity and the consequences of such activity among minors did not play any part in
their decision, one has to wonder how true that actually was. Id. at 696.
101. Id. at 697.
102. Id. at 701-02. Appellants claimed that the advertising of contraceptives
“would be offensive and embarrassing to those exposed to them, and that permitting
them would legitimize sexual activity of young people.” Id. at 701. The Court rejected
this argument and found none of the advertisements encouraged the young people to
partake in sexual activities. Id.
103. Id. at 686.
104. David B. Cruz, “The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Ab
stinence, and the Constitution, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 315 (2000); see also Val
D. Ricks, Marriage and the Constitutional Right to Free Sex: The State Marriage Amend
ments as Response, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 271, 271 (2005) (“A few judges in the
United States have established in their thinking—and in some cases in their jurisdic
tions—a constitutional right to ‘free sex.’”). But see Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E.
Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 50 EMORY L.J. 809, 819 (2010) (stating that the
right to sex view is “overly optimistic about the Supreme Court’s view of these ‘sex
cases’”).
105. Cruz, supra note 104, at 317-18.
106. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir. 2008).

R
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Mississippi,107 Alabama,108 and Virginia,109 as the Fifth Circuit
noted in Reliable Consultants, Inc.110 The Supreme Court of Ala
bama recently upheld the Alabama statute in March 2010.111 The
Supreme Courts of Kansas,112 Louisiana,113 and Colorado114 have
all ruled their respective state statutes banning the sale of sex toys
107.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (1999) states, in relevant part, that
[a] person commits the offense of distributing unlawful sexual devices
when he knowingly sells, advertises, publishes or exhibits to any person any
three-dimensional device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the
stimulation of human genital organs, or offers to do so, or possesses such de
vices with the intent to do so. A person commits the offense of wholesale
distributing unlawful sexual devices when he distributes for the purpose of
resale any three dimensional device designed or marketed as useful primarily
for the stimulation of human genital organs, or offers to do so, or possesses
such devices with the intent to do so.
108. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (LexisNexis 2005) states in relevant part:
(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess
with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material or
any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of
human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value. . . .
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person, being a wholesaler, to knowingly
distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute, for
the purpose of resale or commercial distribution at retail, any obscene mate
rial or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation
of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value. . . .
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce, or offer or
agree to produce, any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as
useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of
pecuniary value.
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374 (2009). The statute makes it unlawful to
knowingly
(1) Prepare any obscene item for the purposes of sale or distribution; or
(2) Print, copy, manufacture, produce, or reproduce any obscene item for
purposes of sale or distribution; or
(3) Publish, sell, rent, lend, transport in intrastate commerce, or dis
tribute or exhibit any obscene item, or offer to do any of these things; or
(4) Have in his possession with intent to sell, rent, lend, transport, or dis
tribute any obscene item. Possession in public or in a public place of any ob
scene item as defined in this article shall be deemed prima facie evidence of a
violation of this section.
Id. “Obscene” items in the statute include: “Any obscene figure, object, article, instru
ment, novelty device, or recording or transcription used or intended to be used in dis
seminating any obscene song, ballad, words or sounds . . . .” Id. § 18.2-373.
110. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 741.
111. 1568 Montgomery Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319, 346 (Ala.
2010).
112. State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1032 (Kan. 1990).
113. State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 76 (La. 2000).
114. People v. Seven Thirty-Five E. Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 372-73 (Colo. 1985)
(en banc).
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unconstitutional. All these rulings took place before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lawrence.
The Colorado Supreme Court found the Colorado anti-vibra
tor statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it “impermissibly bur
dens the right of privacy of those seeking to make legitimate
medical or therapeutic use of such devices. The effect of the statute
as now written is to equate sex with obscenity.”115 Furthermore,
the state had offered no legitimate interest in prohibiting the use of
the devices in these ways, and therefore the statute was deemed
unconstitutional.116
The Kansas Supreme Court struck down Kansas’s statute due
to its overbroad reach, finding that it “impermissibly infringe[d] on
the constitutional right to privacy in one’s home and in one’s doc
tor’s or therapist’s office.”117 The Kansas Supreme Court focused
on the medical uses of the devices.118 It additionally noted that an
other court held that “the consumers’ privacy right in the use of the
devices was inextricably bound with the vendors’ supply of the de
vices,”119 meaning that preventing vendors from selling certain
items affects consumers’ rights.120 The court additionally went on
to state that “[a] therapist or a third person purchasing such a de
vice for a woman at her request would nevertheless be subject to
criminal prosecution.”121 Dr. Mould, one of the doctors who testi
fied at the trial, stated that “he often direct[ed] his patients to adult
bookstores to find dildo vibrators suitable for their therapy treat
ment and that he” was of the “opinion that if [these devices] were
to become not readily available to the general public, anorgasmic
women would be ‘substantially impacted.’”122
In State v. Brenan, Louisiana’s highest court struck down Loui
siana’s obscenity statute because the statute lacked a rational con
nection to the legislature’s intent.123 The legislation stated that the
115. Id. at 370 (citation omitted).
116. Id.
117. Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1032.
118. Id. at 1025-26.
119. Id. at 1029. When discussing the standing of the vendors to sue on behalf of
individual users, the Kansas Supreme Court noted that “where personal privacy is in
volved, potential purchasers may hesitate to assert their own rights because of a desire
to protect that privacy from the publicity caused by a legal action.” Id.
120. Id. at 1029-30.
121. Id. at 1031.
122. Id. at 1025. Dr. Mould noted that the public absence of the sexual devices
would seriously impact the treatment of these women. Id.
123. State v. Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64, 75-76 (La. 2000). The Louisiana statute had
banned “the promotion or wholesale promotion of obscene devices.” Id. at 67. The
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ban on the sale and distribution of the sexual devices was for “the
protection of minors and unconsenting adults.”124 The Louisiana
court believed the real motive of the legislation was to wage war on
obscenity rather than protect minors.125 However, Louisiana re
fused to extend a new fundamental right to the use of sexual de
vices, narrowly reading the substantive due process cases that had
been decided by the United States Supreme Court.126 The court
was aware that if they “extend[ed] constitutional protection to an
asserted right or liberty interest, the courts have, to a great extent,
placed the ‘right’ outside the arena of public debate.”127 This was
something that the Louisiana court was not willing to do, and in
stead it applied rational basis review to overturn the statute.128 The
court additionally recognized the history of the devices and men
tioned the Rachel Maines book.129
IV.

LAWRENCE V. TEXAS

AND THE

CIRCUIT SPLIT

A. Lawrence v. Texas
Though Texas, like Colorado, Kansas, and Louisiana, also had
a statute banning the sale and distribution of sexual devices,130 it
was their statute that banned actual sexual activity that made its
way to the Supreme Court. On June 26, 2003 the United States
Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,131 a principle decision
statute defined “obscene devices” as “‘device[s], including an artificial penis or artificial
vagina, which [are] designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of
human genital organs.’” Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1 (2010), invali
dated by Brenan, 772 So. 2d 64). It is important to note that though invalidated by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, the invalidated section has still not been removed from the
statute. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1. In 2006, a couple was arrested and charged
under this invalidated portion of the obscenity statute. Ruling Could Negate Sex Shop
Busts, THE OUACHITA CITIZEN, Sept. 8, 2006, available at http://www.ouachitacitizen.
com/print.php?story=354. Later, the district attorney dropped the charges under sec
tion 14:106.1, due to the fact the Louisiana Supreme Court had invalidated that portion
of the statute. Attorney: Sex Shop Material Not Obscene, THE OUACHITA CITIZEN,
Sept. 21, 2006, available at http://www.ouachitacitizen.com/news.php?id=377. The
couple was, however, charged under section 14:106 of the statute for selling obscene
videos. Id.
124. Brenan, 772 So. 2d at 68.
125. Id. at 72-73.
126. Id. at 73.
127. Id. at 71.
128. Id. at 70-71, 76.
129. Id. at 76.
130. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21-23 (West 2003), invalidated by Reliable
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
131. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-79 (2003).
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in favor of the gay rights movement. The Court decided whether
Texas could continue to prohibit persons of the same sex from en
gaging in certain sexual conduct.132 The Texas statute made it a
crime to partake in any “deviate sexual intercourse.”133 Texas po
lice officers arrived at the residence of John Geddes Lawrence and
found him engaged in sexual activity with Tyron Garner, activity
that was prohibited by the Texas statute.134 The two men were ar
rested, charged, and convicted of violating the statute.135 They
“challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a like provision of the
Texas Constitution.”136 This challenge was rejected both at the
County Criminal Court and the Court of Appeals for the Texas
Fourteenth District.137 The Court of Appeals followed the United
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick.138 Certiorari
was granted by the Supreme Court to determine whether the con
victions violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection and due process—in other words, whether to overturn
Bowers.139
“‘History and tradition are the starting point but not in all
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’”140
Therefore, the Court proceeded to examine any historical attempts
to regulate homosexual conduct to determine if the Bowers case
was incorrect in determining that there was a long history of
prohibiting homosexual conduct.141 The Court concluded “that
there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at
132. Id. at 562.
133. Id. at 563. The Texas statute provided: “‘A person commits an offense if he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.’” Id.
(quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003), invalidated by Lawrence, 539
U.S. 558. “Deviate sexual intercourse” was defined as: “(A) any contact between any
part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.” Id. (quoting
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1) (West 2003)).
134. Id. at 562-63.
135. Id. at 563.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-96 (1986) (holding that there
was no Constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy, thereby upholding a
Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
140. Id. at 572 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
141. Id. at 567-68.
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homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.”142 Furthermore, prose
cutions of sodomy in the nineteenth century generally did not target
“consenting adults in private,” but rather other non-consensual re
lationships.”143 The Court concluded that the “laws and traditions
in the past half century are of most relevance here.”144
The Court refused to strike down the Texas statute on Equal
Protection grounds, because it anticipated Texas would simply
amend the statute to apply to both homosexual and heterosexual
acts, thereby curing the equal protection problem.145 Instead, the
Court decided it was best to overrule Bowers.146 Lawrence did
“not involve minors,” or others that could be easily taken advan
tage of.147 Instead, Lawrence involved consenting adults who “are
entitled to respect for their private lives.”148 The Court recognized
that the right to this consensual relationship is derived from the
Due Process Clause and, as the Court noted, there was “no legiti
mate state interest which can justify [the] intrusion into the per
sonal and private life of the individual.”149 Additionally, the simple
act of criminalizing homosexual conduct under state law invites dis
crimination against the gay population.150 Over half of the Law
rence opinion was devoted to an explanation of why it was
necessary to overturn Bowers.151 Rightfully so, as stare decisis is an
important jurisprudential doctrine.152
142. Id. at 568. The Court stated, “The absence of legal prohibitions focusing on
homosexual conduct may be explained in part by noting that according to some scholars
the concept of the homosexual as a distinct category of person did not emerge until the
late 19th century.” Id.
143. Id. at 569. The Court further noted that “laws targeting same-sex couples
did not develop until the last third of the 20th century” and that “[i]t was not until the
1970’s that any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution.” Id. at
570.
144. Id. at 571-72. This decision is significant to the gay rights and sexual privacy
movements in general, as there has been an increasing acceptance of both in the past
fifty years. Id. at 571-73. Likewise, Lawrence would be highly pertinent in any attempt
to establish a new fundamental right, as it guides attorneys to focus on the past fifty
years.
145. Id. at 575.
146. Id. at 575-78.
147. Id. at 578.
148. Id.
149. Id. The Court also stated that this statute essentially demeaned the exis
tence of homosexuals and “control[led] their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime.” Id.
150. Id. at 575.
151. Id. at 563-78.
152. Id. at 577.
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B. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Split
In Williams v. Attorney General the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) brought suit on behalf of both sellers and users of
sexual devices in Alabama.153 As stated above,154 the statute did
not prohibit the use or possession of sexual devices, and it also did
not prohibit the sale of “other sexual products such as ribbed con
doms or virility drugs.”155 Rather, the question presented to the
Eleventh Circuit was whether the Alabama statute restricted a fun
damental right.156 The court inquired whether the use of these sex
ual devices fell under an already protected fundamental right or
whether it was necessary to create a new fundamental right that
would cover the issue presented.157 The ACLU, representing the
plaintiffs, argued that the use of sexual devices fell under the al
ready protected realm of substantive due process.158 The ACLU
claimed that through the Alabama statute, the State had “intruded
into the most intimate of places—the bedrooms of its citizens—and
the lawful sexual conduct that occurs therein.”159 Further, they
claimed that though the statute did not prohibit the actual use of
the devices, it placed a “substantial and undue burden on the ability
of the plaintiffs to obtain devices regulated by the statute.”160 The
ACLU thus argued that Alabama violated “the fundamental rights
of privacy and personal autonomy that protect an individual’s law
ful sexual practices guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.”161
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the ACLU’s argument, stating
that “[t]he ACLU invokes ‘privacy’ and ‘personal autonomy’ as if
such phrases were constitutional talismans. In the abstract, how
ever, there is no fundamental right to either.”162 The Eleventh Cir
cuit noted that simply because a decision is “personal” or
153. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).
154. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
155. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1233.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1234.
158. Id. Substantive due process has been “long recognized as providing ‘height
ened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests.’” Id. at 1235 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000),
rev’d, 378 F.3d 1232).
159. Id. at 1235 (quoting Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1261 (N.D. Ala.
2002).
160. Id. (quoting Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1261).
161. Id. (quoting Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1261).
162. Id.

R
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“intimate” does not mean that decision is instinctively or automati
cally protected.163 According to the Williams court, a fundamental
right is one that is “deeply rooted” in the history of the United
States.164
The Eleventh Circuit found nothing in the history of the sub
stantive due process cases decided by the Supreme Court to support
a “right to sexual privacy.”165 Most recently, the circuit noted, the
Supreme Court had the opportunity in Lawrence v. Texas to assert
a broad right to sexual privacy, and the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that Lawrence provided no such ruling.166 What Lawrence did es
tablish, the Eleventh Circuit ruled, was “the unconstitutionality of
criminal prohibitions on consensual adult sodomy.”167 Because the
Supreme Court did not go through the Washington v. Glucksberg
analysis,168 the Eleventh Circuit refused to concede that Lawrence
created any fundamental right, never mind one specifically regard
ing “sexual privacy.”169 The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, went into
its own Glucksberg analysis of the use of sexual devices and ulti
mately found there to be no fundamental right.170
Four years later, the Fifth Circuit decided Reliable Consultants,
Inc. v. Earle, addressing a Texas statute that, like the Alabama stat
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)). Gluck
sberg specifically stated that a fundamental right was “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721
(citation omitted).
165. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1235. The Eleventh Circuit found that after several
opportunities to do so, the Supreme Court refused to recognize such a right and re
iterated that the Supreme Court “has never indicated that the mere fact that an activity
is sexual and private entitles it to protection as a fundamental right.” Id. at 1235-36.
166. Id. at 1236.
167. Id.
168. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. The Court in Glucksberg sought to determine
whether a Washington statute’s “prohibition against ‘caus[ing]’ or ‘aid[ing]’ a suicide
offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 705-06
(alterations in original). In determining a fundamental right, the analysis has two parts.
Id. at 720. First, the right at issue must be deeply rooted in the nation’s history. Id. at
720-21. Second, the Supreme Court also looks at the description of the asserted right.
Id. at 721.
169. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1236. Specifically, the court stated that it was “not
prepared to infer a new fundamental right from an opinion that never employed the
usual Glucksberg analysis for identifying such rights.” Id. at 1237.
170. Id. at 1239-44. In the careful description part of the Glucksberg analysis, the
court decided that the real right at stake in this case was the ability to “sell and
purchase sexual devices,” rather than a broad right to sexual privacy. Id. at 1241-42.
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ute, prohibited the sale and distribution of sexual devices.171 The
plaintiffs ran a business that sold “sexual devices by internet and
mail, and . . . distribute[d] sexual devices ordered in Texas by mail
and common carrier.”172 They brought a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of the Texas statute.173 The Fifth Circuit agreed
with the plaintiffs and rejected Texas’s attempt to frame the right at
issue so narrowly as simply a right to stimulate genital organs.174
While the Eleventh Circuit refused to extend Lawrence v. Texas to
commercial activity, the Fifth Circuit held that Lawrence recog
nized not just “a right to engage in the sexual act itself, but instead
a right to be free from governmental intrusion regarding ‘the most
private human contact, sexual behavior.’”175 The Fifth Circuit
found that Lawrence required it to decide “whether the Texas stat
ute impermissibly burden[ed] the individual’s substantive due pro
cess right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her
choosing.”176 The court found that because individuals could not
purchase sexual devices in the state of Texas, the statute “heavily
burden[ed]” the right at issue.177 This was consistent with the rea
soning in Carey v. Population Services International 178 and Gris
wold v. Connecticut,179 “where the [Supreme] Court held that
171. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2008); see
also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21-.23, invalidated by Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517
F.3d 738. Section 43.21(a)(7) defined “obscene device” as “a device including a dildo or
artificial vagina, designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human
genital organs.” Id. § 43.21(a)(7). Section 43.23 made it a crime if a person “knowing
its content and character, he wholesale promotes or possesses with intent to wholesale
promote any obscene material or obscene device.” Id. § 43.23(a).
172. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 742. The plaintiffs did not own any
businesses in the state of Texas, but wished to increase their presence in the state and
were attempting to challenge the statute in an effort to preempt any prosecution for
that increased presence. Id.
173. Id. at 742-43. Texas tried to argue that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
bring the lawsuit on behalf of individual users. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argu
ment. Id. at 743. It noted the line of Supreme Court cases holding that suits claiming
that bans on certain commercial activities burden an individual’s due process rights can
be brought by those who sell the products. Id.
174. Id. at 743-44. The plaintiffs framed “the right at stake [as] the individual’s
substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct free from govern
ment intrusion.” Id. at 743.
175. Id. at 744.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-90 (1977); see supra
notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
179. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); see supra notes 61
70 and accompanying text.
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restricting commercial transactions unconstitutionally burdened the
exercise of individual rights.”180
V.

THE PRE-LAWRENCE CASES SHOULD SERVE AS THE GUIDE
TO OVERTURNING ANTI-VIBRATOR STATUTES

Creating a new fundamental right is an incredibly difficult en
deavor, and courts do not take such a creation lightly. Therefore,
rather than attempting to create a fundamental right for the use of
sexual devices, this Note argues it is more practical to place the
issue within a pre-existing fundamental right. Due to the fact that
sexual devices and contraceptives are similar in their history of reg
ulation, this Note will further contend that the utilization of sexual
devices can be analogized to the purposes of contraceptives, the use
of which has been ruled to be fundamentally protected. By apply
ing the Supreme Court case law prior to Lawrence, this Note finds a
protected right for the usage of sexual devices. Finally, this Note
will explain the difference in review of a statute affecting a funda
mental right and the importance of that review.
A. A Constitutional Right to Sex?
The so-called “sexual freedom” cases, which include Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Carey, have led some scholars to contemplate
whether there is a “right to sex” embodied in these cases,181 which
is based on the idea that there is “a right to engage in sexual activi
ties for purposes other than reproduction.”182 In Carey, the Su
preme Court stated that “[t]he decision whether or not to beget or
bear a child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally
protected choices,”183 which include such things as “‘procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and educa
tion.’”184 There is a clear trend in the courts towards recognizing
that intimate relationships are no longer, if they ever were, for
purely procreative purposes. Scholars have argued that if there was
no constitutional right to non-procreative sex, then the Court would
not have struck down the anti-contraceptive laws, because these
“laws do not really deprive people of procreative control,” as indi
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
(1973)).

Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 744.
See Holt, supra note 14, at 939 (citing Cruz, supra note 104, at 316).
Id.
Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
Id. at 684-85 (citations omitted) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53
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viduals could just remain abstinent.185 The Court reaffirmed this
trend in the Lawrence decision, where it struck down the Texas
anti-sodomy law as being unconstitutional.186
When creating a new fundamental right in the field of constitu
tional law and privacy, the Supreme Court has stated that they must
“‘exercise the utmost care whenever [it is] asked to break new
ground in this field.’”187 Creating a fundamental right can be in
credibly difficult; a party must properly frame the right and then
demonstrate that it is deeply rooted in the nation’s history. Accord
ingly, it is perhaps best for those challenging anti-vibrator statutes,
like those in Alabama and Texas, to include the sale and purchase
of sexual devices in an already existing right.
B. Why the Regulation of the Sale and Distribution of Vibrators
is Like the Regulation of the Sale and Distribution of
Contraceptives
What do sexual devices, birth control pills, and condoms have
in common? For one, they all have been, or currently are, regu
lated by state statutes.188 Additionally, the statutes that prohibited
the sale of contraceptives were very similar to the current statutes
that prohibit the sale and distribution of sexual devices. For in
stance, in the Eisenstadt case, the Court evaluated a Massachusetts
statute189 that prohibited the distribution of “any drug, medicine,
instrument or article whatever for the prevention of conception.”190
The statute included an exemption whereby a registered physician
was able to prescribe contraceptives to married persons and a phar
macist was allowed to furnish these items with the prescription of a
physician.191
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court read the exemption
provisions to mean that anyone who was not either a registered
physician or a pharmacist would be charged with a felony if they
185. See, e.g., Holt, supra note 14, at 940.
186. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-79 (2003).
187. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (quoting Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
188. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (reviewing
statutes that regulated the use of birth control in the state of Connecticut); Williams v.
Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004) (addressing the regulated sale, and in
turn, the use of sexual devices in the state of Alabama).
189. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972) (discussing MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 272, § 21).
190. Id. at 440-41 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 21).
191. Id. at 441-42.
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distributed any article to be used in the prevention of conception.192
The statute essentially allowed doctors to prescribe contraceptives
to married couples to prevent pregnancy, but not to single individu
als.193 The Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional on
the basis of the Equal Protection clause.194
The current Alabama statute prohibits any person or business
from distributing any device marketed mainly “for the stimulation
of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value.”195 A
person who violates the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor and, if
convicted, could be fined up to $10,000.196 Notably, however, the
current Alabama statute also has an exemption provision, as did the
statute at issue in Eisenstadt. The Alabama statute’s exemption
provides that “[i]t shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of
violating Sections 13A-12-200.2 and 13A-12-200.3 that the act
charged was done for a bona fide medical, scientific, educational,
legislative, judicial, or law enforcement purpose.”197
Likewise, in Carey, the challenged statute prohibited the sale
and distribution of any contraceptive to a person under the age of
sixteen;198 while the statute allowed a “licensed pharmacist” to dis
tribute the contraceptives, they could not “advertise[ ] or display”
contraceptives.199 The Carey statute, which was held unconstitu
tional, also included a provision that allowed a doctor to prescribe
the contraceptives, paralleling the Massachusetts statute in Eisen
stadt, and the statute prohibiting the sale of sexual devices in
Alabama.200
The exemptions provided by the various statutes are an ac
knowledgment that there is a medical need for both contraceptives
and sexual devices, and while both contraceptives and sexual de
vices are used in non-procreative-sexual activity, they also have le
gitimate medical purposes.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 442.
194. Id. at 454-55.
195. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005).
196. Id.
197. § 13A-12-200.4.
198. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 681 n.1 (1977) (discussing
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972)).
199. Id. (quoting § 6811(8)).
200. Id. at 678 (discussing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6807(b) (McKinney 1972)); see
supra notes 191, 197 and accompanying text.
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1. The Similarities Between Contraceptives and Sexual
Devices
The Eleventh and the Fifth Circuits, however, are split on how
to apply Lawrence to their anti-vibrator statutes. As stated earlier,
the Eleventh Circuit, in Williams v. Attorney General, declined to
extend the ruling in Lawrence to the Alabama anti-vibrator stat
ute.201 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Reliable Consultants, Inc. v.
Earle, ruled that Lawrence was broad enough to cover the antivibrator statute in Texas.202 While the two circuits disagree, both
failed to properly make the analogy to the circumstances in Gris
wold, Eisenstadt, and Carey.
Much like with contraceptives, sexual devices are used by mar
ried and un-married persons alike, not exclusively by women.203
Contraceptives are used for multiple reasons, such as the preven
tion of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.204 In June
2000, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), along with the Cen
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the United States Agency for Interna
tional Development (USAID), produced a fact sheet stating that
“[l]atex condoms, when used consistently and correctly, are highly
effective in preventing the sexual transmission of HIV . . . [and can]
reduce[ ] the risk of other sexually transmitted diseases.”205
At the trial level, one of the plaintiffs in Williams,206 an owner
and operator of “Saucy Lady, Inc.,”207 explained that many of those
who attended her sale parties purchased said devices “because they
prefer to avoid sexual relations with others, due to prior negative
relationships, or the risk of sexually transmitted diseases, or other
risks associated with developing an intimate relationship.”208 An
201. Williams v. Att’y Gen. 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (2004).
202. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (2008); see supra notes
175-176.
203. See Indiana University, Vibrator Use Common, Linked to Sexual Health, SCI
ENCE DAILY (June 29, 2009), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/06/0906291006
43.htm; see also Banerjee, supra note 50 (reviewing a book written by Anne Semans,
where the author’s main purpose was to “remove the stigma of sex toys as the compan
ions of lonely women and introducing them into couple’s [sic] love play”).
204. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Pre
vention, Condoms and STDs: Fact Sheet for Public Health Personnel 1-3, http://www.
cdc.gov/condomeffectiveness/docs/Condoms_and_STDS.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
205. Id. at 1.
206. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev’d, 378
F.3d 1232.
207. Id. at 1264.
208. Id. at 1265.
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other plaintiff, Jane Doe, “use[d] the devices to avoid sexually
transmitted diseases, while remaining sexually active.”209 Two re
cent Indiana University studies involving sexual device use among
adult American men and women found “that vibrator use is associ
ated with more positive sexual function and being more proactive in
caring for one’s sexual health.”210
The similarity between sexual devices and contraceptives is not
a new or entirely unexplored concept. In 2006, New Delhi, India
was undergoing a similar battle regarding anti-vibrator statutes.211
Sex toys are banned in India, but the market is quite large.212 “Sex
ologists say that the ban in India on these toys is ridiculous, since
they are the safest, best and cheapest form of sexual entertain
ment.”213 Dr. Prakash Kothari, India’s leading advocate for sexual
devices, believes that these sexual devices “help in facilitating safe
sex thus preventing unwanted pregnancies, controlling population
growth and [the] spread of HIV.”214 He further finds it ironic that
the Indian government actively distributes free condoms, but con
currently bans sexual devices, which similarly help promote safe
sex.215 Kristin Fasullo, a scholar, notes that “[m]edical experts have
also lauded sexual devices as safe alternatives in an era of HIV/
AIDS and high incidence of sexually transmitted infections.”216
Not only do sexual devices assist in protecting against sexually
transmitted diseases, but both sexual devices and certain contracep
tives have medical benefits that cannot be overlooked. “Oral con
traceptives have been found to reduce incidence of PID (pelvic
inflammatory disease) . . . [and] the risk of ectopic pregnancy.”217
Additionally, using birth control pills for one or more years can re
duce the risk of endometrial cancer.218
209. Id. at 1266.
210. Indiana University, supra note 203.
211. Atul Sethi, Palika a Haven for Adult Toys, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Nov. 26,
2006), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Palika-a-haven-for-adult-toys/
articleshow/576431.cms.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Kristin Fasullo, Note, Beyond Lawrence v. Texas: Crafting a Fundamental
Right to Sexual Privacy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2997, 3009 (2009).
217. UNIV. OF WIS. UNIV. HEALTH SERV., BENEFITS OF BIRTH CONTROL PILLS,
(Aug. 2000), http://wellness.uwsp.edu/medinfo/handouts/Benefits%20of%20Birth%20
Control%20Pills.pdf.
218. Id.
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The Food and Drug Administration also acknowledges
the medical usefulness of certain sexual devices.219 Two of their
regulations, entitled “[p]owered vaginal muscle stimulator for
therapeutic use”220 and “[g]enital vibrator for therapeutic
use”221 respectively, implicitly recognize that the same sexual de
vices prohibited by statute in Williams and Reliable Consultants,
Inc. have medicinal value. In State v. Hughes, the Kansas Supreme
Court heard a doctor’s testimony that the vibrator is incredibly
helpful for women who “may be particularly susceptible to pelvic
inflammatory diseases, psychological problems, and difficulty in
marital relationships.”222 The trial court in Williams 223 noted that
several of the plaintiffs used the banned devices for therapeutic
purposes. One woman, for example, had a chronic disability that
made it incredibly painful to engage in traditional intercourse with
a partner, making the use of the devices a necessary part of her
intimate relationships.224
Such findings do not discount the use of sexual devices purely
for purposes of enjoyment. In her article, Pathology Full Circle: A
History of Anti-Vibrator Legislation in the United States, Danielle
Lindemann expresses concern over reducing the value of these de
vices to purely medical applications, as they were in the past, and
not recognizing their use by women for purposes of sexual plea
sure.225 While Ms. Lindemann’s argument is a valid one, it risks
pigeonholing the devices by ignoring the fact that they are not used
by women alone. As the Indiana University studies show, fiftythree percent of women and forty-five percent of men in the United
States reportedly use these devices.226 The studies found that
219. Powered Vaginal Muscle Stimulator for Therapeutic Use, 21 C.F.R.
§ 884.5940 (2010); Genital Vibrator Therapeutic Use, 21 C.F.R. § 884.5960.
220. § 884.5940 (identifying that the “device is intended and labeled for therapeu
tic use in increasing muscular tone and strength in the treatment of sexual
dysfunction”).
221. § 884.5960 (identifying the “device as intended and labeled for therapeutic
use in the treatment of sexual dysfunction or [as] an adjunct to Kegel’s exercise”).
222. State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Kan. 1990).
223. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1266 (N.D. Ala., 2002), rev’d, 378
F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
224. Id.
225. Danielle J. Lindemann, Pathology Full Circle: A History of Anti-Vibrator
Legislation in the United States, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326, 342 (2006).
226. Indiana University, supra note 203 (discussing studies funded by the maker
of Trojan brand sexual-health products which looked at the sexual habits of 2,056 wo
men and 1,047 men between the ages of eighteen and sixty). The studies noted that
female “[v]ibrator users were significantly more likely to have had a gynecological exam
during the past year” and male users “were more likely to report participation in sexual
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ninety-one percent of men who used vibrators did so with a female
partner.227 The study tends to support the theory that, like contra
ceptives, these devices are an integral part of a healthy sexual rela
tionship between two people. It is a legitimate concern for critics to
want to ensure that society does not regress back to a time when
vibrators were thought to be purely medical devices for curing hys
teria.228 However, it is inaccurate to assume that because the other
benefits and uses of sexual devices may be therapeutic—thus val
idly bringing these devices into the realm of constitutional protec
tion—society is reverting back to paternalism.
2. Applying Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey
While the Lawrence decision might have reiterated that inti
mate non-procreative relationships are protected from government
intrusion, it did not involve any non-biological devices that were
being regulated by the state. Due to the fact that contraceptives
and sexual devices have many similarities, in order to show that
these anti-vibrator statutes are unconstitutional, a better analysis
involves the same rationale applied by the Supreme Court in cases
challenging anti-contraceptive laws.
There is a strong conceptual similarity between contraceptives
and sexual devices because both are used by married and un-mar
ried persons, and there have been various attempts to regulate their
sale. With the exception of the statute in Griswold, which prohib
ited the actual use of contraceptives,229 the other anti-contraceptive
statutes attempted to regulate their sale and distribution,230 much
like the current anti-vibrator statutes do.
health promoting behaviors.” Id.; see also Romi Lassally, Sex Toys for Tweens, Aug.
27, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/romi-lassally/sex-toys-for-tweens_b_270300.
html (a post debating whether mothers of teenage daughters should purchase sex toys
for their daughters). The post mentions an Oprah segment where a “sexpert” sug
gested that this might encourage abstinence. Lassally, supra. Dr. Karen Rayne
weighed in on when a young girl should be exposed to such devices as a vibrator, noting
that “the problem with going too young is that it might just scare her off masturbation
entirely. In general, I would probably suggest when she turns sixteen. However, with
the caveat that some girls will put them to good use younger.” Id.
227. Indiana University, supra note 203.
228. Lindemann, supra note 225, at 343.
229. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965) (involving a Connecticut
statute that made it illegal for a person to use “any drug . . . or instrument for the
purpose of preventing conception”).
230. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 680 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1972); see also supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
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The Court in Eisenstadt found that the Massachusetts law that
prohibited the sale of contraceptives would “materially impair the
ability of single persons to obtain contraceptives.”231 The statute in
question in Eisenstadt allowed single persons to purchase contra
ceptives to prevent diseases, but not conception.232 This is similar
to the anti-vibrator statutes that allow the distribution of sexual de
vices for therapeutic purposes from a doctor or counselor, but not
for other purposes or from a business other than a doctor’s of
fice.233 The Court in Carey noted that “decisions whether to ac
complish or to prevent conception are among the most private and
sensitive.”234 Likewise, sexual devices are used by individuals and
couples, and are often used to prevent pregnancy and the transmis
sion of sexually transmitted diseases.235 Carey further held that “[a]
total prohibition against [the] sale of contraceptives, for example,
would intrude upon individual decisions in matters of procreation
and contraception as harshly as a direct ban on their use.”236 Es
sentially, the Court has recognized that there is a right among indi
viduals to make decisions impacting their sexual activity, including
the personal determination of which items, meant to assist or pre
vent contraception, will be brought into their bedroom. The Court
noted that a prohibition on the sale of contraceptives “might have
an even more devastating effect upon the freedom to choose
contraception.”237
Likewise, even though the use of sexual devices is allowed, the
prohibition on their sale significantly burdens a person’s right to
invite those items into their bedroom for the purposes of sexual
intimacy, not for procreative purposes. If persons choose to involve
sexual devices in their intimate relationships (or alone) in hopes of
preventing the acquisition of sexually transmitted diseases and un
wanted pregnancy, the prohibition of their sale, like that of contra
ceptives, seriously limits the “distribution channels to a small
fraction of the total number of possible retail outlets . . . [and]
reduces the opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase.”238
231. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446.
232. Id. at 449.
233. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).
234. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
235. See Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1266 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev’d, 378
F.3d 1232.
236. Carey, 431 U.S. at 687-88 (emphasis added).
237. Id. at 688.
238. Id. at 689.
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The cases pre-Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey dealing with
contraceptive statutes and their reasoning read very similar to the
current court cases refusing to deem anti-vibrator statutes unconsti
tutional. In 1956, in State v. Kohn, the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld a law that prohibited the sale of contraceptives without just
cause.239 The “just cause” in the statute was found to mean cause
found by a physician or druggist, perhaps being prescribed to pre
vent a disease.240 Because the statute had this “just cause” provi
sion, which the court took to mean for medical purposes, the statute
was upheld.241
Similarly, in Williams v. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit
found it important that the statute provided an exemption for “sales
of sexual devices” for medical purposes.242 This reasoning ignores
the fact that preventing the in-state sale and distribution severely
limits the manner in which people can purchase these devices for
purposes allowed under the statute. As the doctor testified in State
v. Hughes, intra-state unavailability severely impacts an individual’s
ability to purchase sexual devices; this is true even with the option
of going to another state to purchase them.243
The variety of uses and purposes of sexual devices, like those
of contraceptives, coupled with the introduction of the devices into
an intimate relationship, make Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey the
correct line of cases under which to analyze these anti-vibrator
statutes.
3. Why the Statutes Would Fare Better Under the Type of
Review Granted to an Already Existing Fundamental Right
The Due Process Clause “‘provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental
239.

State v. Kohn, 127 A.2d 451, 455 (N.J. 1956). The New Jersey statute stated:
“Any person who, without just cause, utters or exposes to the view of
another, or possesses with intent to utter or expose to the view of another, or
to sell the same, any instrument, medicine or other thing, designed or purport
ing to be designed for the prevention of conception or the procuring of abor
tion, or who in any way advertises or aids in advertising the same, or in any
manner, whether by recommendation for or against its use or otherwise, gives
or causes to be given, or aids in giving any information how or where any such
instrument, medicine or other thing may be had, seen, bought or sold, is a
disorderly person.”
Id. at 452 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-75 (repealed 1978)).
240. Id. at 454-55.
241. Id. at 455.
242. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).
243. State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Kan. 1990).
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rights.’”244 In Carey, the Supreme Court ruled that prohibitions on
the sale of contraceptives “‘may be justified only by a compelling
state interest and must be narrowly drawn to express only the legiti
mate state interests at stake.’”245 While this heightened scrutiny
applies to statutes affecting fundamental rights, it does not apply to
statutes affecting subject matters like economics or tax.246 If a fun
damental right is not implicated, the court will apply a more defer
ential standard to the statute known as “rational basis review.”247
Rational basis review does not require the same level of scrutiny by
a reviewing court and only requires that the statute be “rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest.”248 When a statute is
examined under rational basis review, the burden is on the chal
lenging party to negate “‘every conceivable basis which might sup
port it.’”249 Under this review, there is a presumption of
constitutionality, and judicial review is not a time for the courts to
second-guess legislative choices.250 When a statute is reviewed
under a high legislative deference standard such as rational basis
review, it is rare for a court to hold that statute unconstitutional and
the presumption of validity will prevail,251 unless it is based on
“grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objec
tives.”252 This standard lies in vast contrast to the heightened
review that a statute affecting a fundamental right will receive. A
heightened review standard, while not always reaching strict scru
tiny,253 does not provide the same deference to a state’s justification
for a statute as granted under rational basis review. Such height
ened scrutiny often involves a balancing of the right asserted and
the government purpose for regulating that asserted right.254
244. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Gluck
sberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
245. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)).
246. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985).
247. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008).
248. Id. at 55.
249. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Cook, 528 F.3d at 55 (quoting Heller, 509 U.S. at 324) (holding that the
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute did not violate the Due Process Clause).
253. Strict scrutiny requires that a statute be “narrowly tailored to serve a com
pelling state interest.” Id.
254. Id. at 55-56; see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992) (balanc
ing the interest of a person rejecting psychotropic drugs against the government’s inter
est in trying a competent criminal defendant); Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health,
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The Eleventh and Fifth Circuits both used Lawrence v. Texas
to rule on the Alabama and Texas statutes respectively.255 Each
circuit, using the same Supreme Court case, reached very different
conclusions. The proper standard of review to apply to the antivibrator statutes has been unclear to lower courts, particularly after
Lawrence v. Texas.256 The First Circuit noted that several courts
read Lawrence to have applied a rational basis standard of re
view,257 others have claimed the Court used strict scrutiny,258 and
yet others, including the First Circuit, have read Lawrence to be
neither rational or strict, but an in-between standard that requires a
balancing of interests.259 The difference in outcome when applying
these standards can be seen in the current circuit split. When apply
ing rational basis review, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Ala
bama anti-vibrator statute did not violate the Due Process Clause
and found public morality sufficed as a legitimate government in
terest.260 In contrast, when the Fifth Circuit applied a heightened
scrutiny test (what it believed to be the proper standard after Law
rence), it found the Texas anti-vibrator statute to “impermissibly
burden[ ]” “the right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or
her choosing.”261
The current circuit split demonstrates the issue with framing
the right that these anti-vibrator statutes affect,262 which is a princi
ple reason for arguing that the use of sexual devices falls within the
already existing right to contraception. The split additionally high
497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) (balancing “protected liberty interest” in declining un
wanted medical treatment with the government’s interest in promoting life); Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-22 (1982) (balancing right of a person to avoid bodily
restraint against the State’s reasons for justifying restraint).
255. See supra notes 166-170, 175-180 and accompanying text.
256. See Cook, 528 F.3d at 49-52.
257. Id. at 51 n.5.
258. Id. at 51 n.6.
259. Id. at 51 n.7.
260. Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007).
261. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 743-44 (5th Cir. 2008). The
Eleventh Circuit used the “impermissibl[y] burdens” test. Id. at 743. Casey created
“the ‘undue burden’ test, which balance[s] the state’s legitimate interest in potential
human life against the extent of the imposition on the woman’s liberty interest” in the
autonomy of her own body. Cook, 528 F.3d at 55 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)).
262. Reliable Consultants, Inc. framed the right at issue as a “right to engage in
private intimate conduct of his or her choosing.” Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at
744. Williams framed the right as “whether the Constitution protects a right to sell and
buy sexual devices, [as well as] a right to use such devices.” Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378
F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted).

R
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lights the importance of the review standard applied to these stat
utes. If the use of sexual devices does not receive the form of
heightened scrutiny typically afforded a fundamental right, any gov
ernment interest will suffice in justifying the ban on buying and sell
ing sexual devices, leading to results such as the one seen in the
Eleventh Circuit in Williams.
When the right to buy and sell sexual devices is placed under
the existing right that protects access to contraception, the same
standard of review applied in Carey v. Population Services Interna
tional and Eisenstadt v. Baird will be applied. In Carey, the Su
preme Court ruled “that when a State . . . burdens the exercise of a
fundamental right, its attempt to justify that burden as a rational
means for the accomplishment of some significant state policy re
quires more than a bare assertion, based on a conceded complete
absence of supporting evidence, that the burden is connected to
such a policy.”263 The Court rejected the State’s rationale for limit
ing the sale of contraceptives to minors, which the State argued was
to stress “the seriousness with which the State views the decision to
engage in sexual intercourse.”264 In Eisenstadt, the State’s interest
in protecting “morals through ‘regulating the private sexual lives of
single persons’” was rejected, as the Court believed the actual goal
was purely to limit the sale of contraception.265 Texas had similar
justifications for its anti-vibrator statute, which were “‘discouraging
prurient interests in autonomous sex and the pursuit of sexual grati
fication unrelated to procreation and prohibiting the commercial
sale of sex.’”266 In Alabama, the State argued that their interest in
protecting public morality was a legitimate government interest sur
viving rational basis review of the anti-vibrator statute.267 Had the
Alabama statute been reviewed under the standard set forth in Ca
rey, it is highly unlikely the government interest would have been
sufficient justification for the burden on purchasing the sexual
devices.

263. Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977).
264. Id. at 697.
265. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442 (1972) (quoting Sturgis v. Att’y Gen.,
260 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Mass. 1970)).
266. Reliable Consultants, Inc., 517 F.3d at 745 (quoting the State’s “asserted
interests”).
267. Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007).
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CONCLUSION
There is currently an ongoing debate about how to frame the
right at issue here.268 However, rather than attempting to try and
frame an entirely different fundamental right, this Note has sug
gested adding the purchase and sale of sexual devices under the
umbrella of the right encompassing the purchase and sale of contra
ceptives. As the Supreme Court noted in Washington v. Gluck
sberg, the addition of another fundamental right is not a task that is
to be taken lightly. There appears to be a real hesitation amongst
the courts, the lower courts in particular, to add an additional right
to the already existing list. The history of sexual devices in the
United States, and the current studies on their use, allow sexual
devices to be fairly easily compared to contraceptives. The similari
ties between the uses and the regulation of sexual devices and con
traceptives would allow a court to protect the purchase of sexual
devices without having to go through the burdensome Glucksberg
analysis. Additionally, due to the vagueness of the Lawrence deci
sion with regards to whether it actually created a new broader fun
damental right to privacy, previous cases offer more guidance
regarding how to defeat these statutes attempting to regulate the
commercial activity at issue. If the courts accept this analogy, they
will most likely follow the reasoning put forth in the line of cases
overruling the anti-contraceptive statutes, and therefore hold the
anti-vibrator statutes unconstitutional.
Julie McKenna*

268. See Fasullo, supra note 216, at 3009 (arguing for a broader fundamental right
to sexual privacy); Lindemann, supra note 225, at 326 (arguing that framing the right
around the medical uses of sexual devices ignores the necessity of a right for a woman
to use these devices in whichever way they choose).
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